Why doesn’t George W. Bush fire Attorney General Alberto Gonzales? Like Donald Rumsfeld before him and, more recently, Paul Wolfowitz, Gonzales is causing President Bush political embarrassment and costing him political support. The President’s supporters praise his personal loyalty to subordinates. His critics charge him with arrogance and unwillingness to admit error. But both sides, while recognizing Bush’s loss of political capital, fail to recognize his protection of something he regards as more critical: his social capital.
Showing posts with label Politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Politics. Show all posts
Tuesday, May 08, 2007
Tuesday, May 01, 2007
China's corruption crackdown enters the bedroom
The Guardian Unlimited
April 30, 2007
China's 6.5 million civil servants were warned today they could be fired for keeping a mistress or neglecting elderly relatives, under new ethical guidelines aimed at curbing rampant corruption.
Prime minister Wen Jiabao signed the code of conduct, which will extend deep into the private lives of bureaucrats once it comes into effect in June.
Officials face possible dismissal if they are caught with a prostitute or abusing drugs, according to the People's Daily.
Full Article
April 30, 2007
China's 6.5 million civil servants were warned today they could be fired for keeping a mistress or neglecting elderly relatives, under new ethical guidelines aimed at curbing rampant corruption.
Prime minister Wen Jiabao signed the code of conduct, which will extend deep into the private lives of bureaucrats once it comes into effect in June.
Officials face possible dismissal if they are caught with a prostitute or abusing drugs, according to the People's Daily.
Full Article
Monday, March 12, 2007
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
by Asim Ijaz Khwaja and Atif Mian
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 120, issue 4, pages 1371-1411
Abstract: Corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills, particularly in less developed economies. Using a loan-level data set of more than 90,000 firms that represents the universe of corporate lending in Pakistan between 1996 and 2002, we investigate rents to politically connected firms in banking. Classifying a firm as "political" if its director participates in an election, we examine the extent, nature, and economic costs of political rent provision. We find that political firms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates. Such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks-private banks provide no political favors. Using firm fixed effects and exploiting variation for the same firm across lenders or over time allows for cleaner identification of the political preference result. We also find that political rents increase with the strength of the firm's politician and whether he or his party is in power, and fall with the degree of electoral participation in his constituency. We provide direct evidence against alternative explanations such as socially motivated lending by government banks to politicians. The economy-wide costs of the rents identified are estimated to be 0.3 to 1.9 percent of GDP every year.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 120, issue 4, pages 1371-1411
Abstract: Corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills, particularly in less developed economies. Using a loan-level data set of more than 90,000 firms that represents the universe of corporate lending in Pakistan between 1996 and 2002, we investigate rents to politically connected firms in banking. Classifying a firm as "political" if its director participates in an election, we examine the extent, nature, and economic costs of political rent provision. We find that political firms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates. Such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks-private banks provide no political favors. Using firm fixed effects and exploiting variation for the same firm across lenders or over time allows for cleaner identification of the political preference result. We also find that political rents increase with the strength of the firm's politician and whether he or his party is in power, and fall with the degree of electoral participation in his constituency. We provide direct evidence against alternative explanations such as socially motivated lending by government banks to politicians. The economy-wide costs of the rents identified are estimated to be 0.3 to 1.9 percent of GDP every year.
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